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Regulating the coal industry – striking a 
balance between commercial and public 
interests: A Queensland case study  
Julie Anne Tarr 
ABSTRACT 
The coal industry in Queensland operates in a very complex regulatory environment with a 
matrix of Federal and State laws covering the environment, health and safety, taxation and 
royalties, tenure, and development approvals. The Queensland government in 2012 
recognised the validity of certain industry concerns and passed two Acts being the 
Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) Amendment Act 2012 (‘the Greentape 
Act”) and the Mines Legislation (Streamlining) Amendment Act 2012 (“the Streamlining 
Act”). Other changes are foreshadowed in relation to overlapping tenure and in the 
development of common resources legislation. Accordingly there is a great level of activity 
and change that has occurred or which is on the horizon. 
This article focuses upon these regulatory changes and foreshadows other areas requiring 
consideration. It commences with a consideration of the changes that have already 
occurred, examines those regulatory amendments that are on the drawing board and 
concludes with suggestions as to further interventions and amendments that have the 
potential to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the legislative framework in which 
coal mining is conducted. 
<DIV>INTRODUCTION 
With more than 30 billion tonnes of identified resources (in situ) of black coal in the State, the coal 
industry is a major contributor to Queensland’s economy and the largest exporter of seaborne coal in 
the world.
1
 Resource companies in Queensland achieved a saleable production of 187 MT of coal 
from open cut and underground mining operations in the financial year 2011-2012.
2
 However, the 
industry is under considerable stress due to several factors such as the high Australian dollar, rising 
labour and materials costs, falling commodity prices and taxation and royalty increases.
3
 
 In addition to these factors the coal industry has pointed to excessive “green tape” and “red tape” 
as well as unwieldy legislation in areas such as overlapping mining and petroleum tenure as adding 
significant costs and uncertainty in the development of new mines and associated infrastructure such 
 
 BA (Wisconsin), JD (Cornell), LLM (Monash), PhD (UQld). Professor, Commercial Law, Faculty of Business, Queensland 
University of Technology. Professor Tarr has authored three books and has co-authored the Laws of Australia: Insurance Law 
(Title 22) and Insurance Contracts (Title 8.7) since 1996. 
1 See Queensland Government, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Queensland Coal Inventory at 
http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/mining/coal-inventory.htm. See also Galligan AG and Mengel DC, “Code for Reporting of 
Identified Coal Resources and Reserves” (1986) Queensland Government Mining Journal 87 at 201-203. 
2 See Queensland Government, Department of Natural Resources & Mines, Annual Coal Statistics 2011-2012 Financial Year, 
http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/assets/coal-stats-pdf/fyr_1112.pdf. 
3 See eg Marius Kloppers M, BHP Billiton Chief Executive Officer, “Queensland Coal Expansion Unlikely”, The Courier Mail 
(17 October 2012). 
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as rail and port facilities. The coal industry operates in a very complex regulatory environment with a 
matrix of Federal and State laws covering the environment, health and safety, taxation and royalties, 
tenure, and development approvals. The Queensland Government in 2012 recognised the validity of 
certain industry concerns and passed two Acts being the Environmental Protection (Greentape 
Reduction) Amendment Act 2012 (the Greentape Act) and the Mines Legislation (Streamlining) 
Amendment Act 2012 (the Streamlining Act). In addition a Government Industry Steering Group has 
been established to consider and carry forward recommendations and processes contained in the 
Queensland Resources Council’s report4 on overlapping tenure. Moreover a Queensland Resources 
Cabinet Committee established by the Queensland Government has actively solicited input from the 
resources sector as to areas of concern or focus going forward to enhance resource sector 
development. Accordingly there is a great level of activity and change that has occurred or which is 
on the horizon. 
 This article focuses upon these regulatory changes and foreshadows other areas requiring 
consideration. It commences with a consideration of the changes that have already occurred, 
examines those regulatory amendments that are on the drawing board and concludes with suggestions 
as to further interventions and amendments that have the potential to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the legislative framework in which coal mining is conducted. 
<DIV>THE GREENTAPE ACT 
In introducing this legislation into Parliament the Minister for Environment and Heritage Protection, 
the Hon AC Powell, stated: 
<blockquote> 
The green-tape reduction project commenced in 2010 with the aim to reform the licensing application and 
assessment processes under the Environmental Protection Act 1994 to reduce costs for industry and 
government while upholding environmental standards for the community … It is a coordinated package of 
legislation, business processes and information systems reform that has been developed in close 
consultation with industry.5 
</blockquote> 
 The principal thrust of the legislation is to achieve a licensing model proportionate to the 
environmental risk by providing three different application types that are based on the risk the 
environmentally relevant activities (ERAs) pose to the environment.
6
 It was considered that the 
process for licensing ERAs had not been revised since the enactment of the Environmental Protection 
Act 1994 and that with the passage of years new regulations had been added to address new concerns 
and to meet community expectations and in parallel business practices had evolved to render some 
requirements redundant. The Act creates three different application types – standard, variation and 
site specific – that are intended to correspond to the risk the ERAs pose to the environment.7 Where 
lower risk ERAs for which standard conditions have been developed are contemplated, an applicant 
for an environmental authority may make a standard application if they comply with eligibility 
criteria.
8
 Where an activity meets the eligibility criteria the operator will automatically receive 
standard conditions upon application without having to go through an assessment process. To provide 
flexibility, where an operator cannot meet all the standard conditions, they may make a variation 
application to change some of the conditions.
9
 A variation application to a standard approval is 
 
4 See Queensland Resources Council, Maximising Utilisation of Queensland’s Coal and Coal Seam Gas Resources – a New 
Approach to Overlapping Tenure in Queensland (May 2012). 
5 Hansard (29 May 2012), p 195. 
6 Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2012, Explanatory Notes, p 2. 
7 Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012, s 8. 
8 Environmental Protection Act 1994, s 122; inserted by Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2012, s 8. 
9 Environmental Protection Act 1994, s 123; inserted by Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2012, s 8. 
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assessed on the basis of the variation only, meaning that it is a much simpler and focused assessment 
process.
10
 All ERAs not subject to standard conditions will be required to make a site specific 
application.
11
 
 Of particular importance to mining companies the Act provides for all ERAs on tenure to be 
contained in a single environmental authority, unlike the prior position where only mining activities 
could be included on the environmental authority.
12
 This addresses the concern that commonly arose 
where a mining company wanted to sell non-mineral extracted materials having to have an 
environmental authority for their mining activities and a development approval for their other 
extractive activities notwithstanding that the two approvals would have almost identical provisions – 
but managed separately with separate fees and administrative requirements. Under the system 
introduced by the Act, the development approval becomes an environmental authority and the mining 
company is able to amalgamate the two environmental authorities into a single project authority with 
one reporting date and one annual fee requirement
13
. Processes for mining companies are streamlined 
by providing for transfers of environmental authorities between suitable operators
14
 and through 
elimination of much duplication – for example, where a mining company has already undertaken an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) and the assessment of environmental risks is the same for the 
environmental authority, the information and notification stages will be undertaken as part of the EIS 
process to remove any duplication of process.
15
 
 The Act introduces a large number of minor changes to the Environmental Protection Act 1994 
all designed to achieve regulatory efficiency in administrative processes without reducing or 
removing environmental standards. It is beyond the compass of this article to canvass all of these 
provisions but it is clear that the thrust of the Greentape reforms have been well received by the 
resources sector.
16
 
<DIV>THE STREAMLINING ACT 
The Mines Legislation (Streamlining) Amendment Act 2012 is the first outcome of a Streamlining 
Approvals Project that commenced in 2009 with the aim of reducing the time taken to process 
resources permit applications without compromising the rigour of the assessment process. In a Press 
release announcing the legislation
17
 the Minister for Natural Resources and Mines, the Hon Andrew 
Cripps, stated that the legislation is “a significant first step towards much needed modernisation of 
Queensland’s resource legislation framework and the service delivery that underpins it”.  
 Central to this is the introduction of an online service delivery platform to facilitate online 
transactions through a MyMinesOnline system. This online lodgement and management of resource 
tenure in Queensland “moves the approvals process into the 21st Century”18 and has the potential to 
reduce the demands upon government and industry personnel.  
 The Act also establishes a common structure, terminology and assessment processes for 
resources activities required under the five legislative frameworks provided by the Mineral Resources 
Act 1989, the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004, the Petroleum Act 1923, the 
 
10 Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2012, Explanatory Notes, p 2. 
11Environmental Protection Act 1994, s 124; inserted by Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act 2012, s 8. 
12 Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2012, Explanatory Notes, p 4. 
13Environmental Protection Act 1994, Pt 8, ss 243-250; inserted by Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and 
Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012, s 8. 
14 Environmental Protection Act 1994,Ibid., Pt 9. 
15 Environmental Protection Act 1994,Ibid., Pt 3. 
16 See eg, The Queensland Resources Council, State of the Sector (June 2012) 
http://qrc.org.au/_dbase_upl/SOS_June2012_web.pdf. 
17 Queensland Government, New Legislation Cuts Resource Industry Red Tape (Press Release, 2 August 2012). 
18 Michael Roche M, Chief Executive Officer, Queensland Resources Council, Submission to the Agriculture, Resources and 
Environment Committee, Queensland Parliament (9 August 2012). 
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Greenhouse Storage Act 2009, and the Geothermal Energy Act 2010. These amendments reduce 
unnecessary complexity by having one common process for these transactions.
19
 
 The Act includes amendments to maintain existing jurisdictional arrangements for safety and 
health at mines following the enactment of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011
20
 to ensure that 
major hazard facilities at coal and mine sites continue to be regulated under the Coal Mining Safety 
and Health Act 1999 and the Mining and Quarry Safety and Health Act 1999. The Mineral Resources 
Act 1989 is amended to align with the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 to allow 
the Minister to approve mining leases to shorten the approvals timeframe and to eliminate what the 
Queensland Resources Council described as a “tick and flick process that provides no additional 
assessment prior to approval or refusal”21 by the Governor in Council.22 
 Compulsory acquisition of land is necessary under various resumptive laws in Queensland
23
 to 
facilitate economic development and infrastructure such as roads and rail. However by this legislation 
the government has sought to preserve resource interests being rights under or in relation to resource 
tenure and authority in connection with resumed land so that these resource interests are not 
extinguished unless those interests are incompatible with the purpose of the take.
24
 This is consistent 
with the legislative intent evident in most Queensland resources legislation; namely, to optimise 
resource extraction and to avoid sterilisation of resources. 
 The Act also deals importantly with relinquishment of areas of exploration permits for coal 
(EPCs) with EPC holders required to relinquish 40% of the area after the first three years after grant 
of the tenement and by a further 50% of the remaining area of the tenement by the end of the first five 
years after the grant of the tenement.
25
 Clearly it is the government’s desire that exploration tenures 
should move quickly to production and there is a strong imperative to avoid land banking – 
government revenues derive from royalties on production, not from land that lies idle. On their face 
the relinquishment conditions in this Act represent an improvement on the pre-existing arrangement 
of 20% per annum. However, this analysis may be too simple as this change should be considered 
together with a newly introduced “cash bid” process for EPCs. On 13 January 2012 the Queensland 
Government announced major reforms to the way land would be made available to coal. New 
applications for coal tenure may no longer be made over the counter, instead a competitive tender 
process and controlled land release for coal is to be implemented. To manage these changes a 
transitional Restricted Area 394(RA394) has been declared over the State of Queensland to prohibit 
further new applications for coal being submitted while a tender process is implemented.
26
 The 
rationale behind this new tender process is twofold – to align the process for coal to that which 
applies to petroleum tender under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 and to 
ensure that the applicant best able to optimise the value of the State’s resources is selected. This 
development has not been uniformly well received in that some of the smaller capitalised explorers 
have asserted that this cash bidding process will inhibit their market access and put them at an unfair 
financial disadvantage as against the bigger mining companies. Also it is a concern that the 
introduction of this competitive bidding process may signal or drive intent to a more rigorous 
enforcement of relinquishment requirements which could have an impact upon coal companies land 
tenure and expose companies to additional costs. 
 
19 Mines Legislation (Streamlining) Amendment Act 2012, ss 47-74 (for amendments to the Mineral Resources Act 1989). 
20 This Act is based on the model Work Health and Safety legislation designed to introduce new national work safety laws. So 
far NSW, Queensland, the ACT, the NT and the Commonwealth have passed model laws. 
21 Roche, n 18 Chief Executive Officer, Queensland Resources Council, Submission to the Agriculture, Resources and 
Environment Committee, Queensland Parliament, 9 August 2012. 
22 Mineral Resources Act 1989, s 271; inserted by Mines Legislation (Streamlining) Amendment Act 2012, s 60. 
23 For example, Acquisition of Land Act 1967. 
24 Mineral Resources Act 1989, s 10AAA; inserted by Mines Legislation (Streamlining) Amendment Act 2012, s 48. 
25 Mineral Resources Act 1989, s 139; inserted by Mines Legislation (Streamlining) Amendment Act 2012, s 55. 
26 Queensland Government Gazette (13 January 2012), Vol 359, No 6. 
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 Notwithstanding these reservations, in general the coal industry has welcomed the Greentape Act 
and the Streamlining Act. The Queensland Resources Council have stated that these Acts go “hand in 
glove” to deliver much needed reforms, to deliver greater certainty predictability and transparency to 
the mining approvals process and bring with them the ability for resource tenures to be managed 
online.
27
 Positive as these legislative enactments may be they do not constitute the end of the reform 
process necessary to improve the regulatory environment for the coal industry in Queensland. In the 
following sections attention is drawn to other areas and initiatives that require attention. 
<DIV>OVERLAPPING TENURE 
The current framework for managing overlapping coal and coal seam gas (CSG) tenure in Queensland 
was first introduced in 2004 with the passage of the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 
2004 and associated amendments to the Mineral Resources Act 1989 and the Petroleum Act 1923. 
This regime is designed to support co-development of coal and CSG to maximise revenues available 
to the State by facilitating development of both resources. The thrust of the legislation is that parties 
holding exploration tenure
28
 who want to proceed to production tenure
29
 must negotiate co-
development agreements and file coordination arrangements outlining these development agreements 
to be approved by the Minister.
30
 The Minister is given decision-making capacity to impose a solution 
where agreement is not attainable;
31
 for example, absent agreement, a gas company holding an 
authority to prospect for petroleum (ATP) may apply to the Minister to make a “preference decision” 
allowing the gas company to apply for a petroleum lease in priority to a mining lease application. 
While the holder of production lease (Petroleum Lease or Mining Lease) must make reasonable 
attempts to reach an agreement with an applicant who follows and wishes to establish a production 
lease for the other resource over an area where there is already a granted production lease, there is no 
compulsion and effectively the production lease holder has veto rights over exploration and 
production activities for the other resource.
32
  
 These statutory arrangements can give rise to considerable delay as gas and coal parties holding 
exploration tenure endeavour to negotiate agreements to facilitate the co-development of resources 
within overlapping land areas. Moreover these overlapping tenure provisions permit “lock out”, veto 
rights and competition for access to resources.
33
 Accordingly legislative reform is being considered in 
Queensland to address the uncertainty and difficulty in negotiating agreements where timeframes are 
not stipulated and outcomes are uncertain. A draft Mines and Petroleum Legislation Amendment Bill 
2011 contained provisions that endeavoured to address some of these concerns. However, following 
strong industry reaction in the consultation process a Joint Coal and CSG Overlapping Tenures 
Working Group was established under the auspices of the Queensland Resources Council. The 
catalyst for current reform is a report prepared by this group (the “Overlapping Tenures 
Report”)34.The catalyst for current reform is the report prepared under the auspices of the 
Queensland Resources Council by a joint Coal and CSG Working Group (the “Overlapping Tenures 
Report”).34 The position articulated in this report is that regardless of any overlapping tenure that 
there should be a direct path to grant of production tenure for coal and CSG. This would allow the 
grant of petroleum leases (PLs) over mining leases (MLs) and other coal tenements (mineral 
 
27 See eg, Michael Roche, n 18 Chief Executive Officer, Queensland Resources Council, Submission to the Agriculture, 
Resources and Environment Committee, Queensland Parliament, 9 August 2012. 
28 An authority to prospect (ATP) granted under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 or the Petroleum Act 
1923 or an exploration permit for coal (EPC) granted under the Mineral Resources Act 1989. 
29 A petroleum lease (PL) granted under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 or the Petroleum Act 1923 or 
a mining lease (ML) granted under the Mineral Resources Act 1989. 
30 See the Mineral Resources Act 1989, Pt 7AA. 
31 Mineral Resources Act 1989, ss 318BA-318BD; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004, ss 318-330. 
32 Mineral Resources Act 1989, s 318CA; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004, s 349. 
33 Mineral Resources Act 1989, s 318CA; Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004, s 349Idem. 
34 See Queensland Resources Council, Maximising Utilisation of Queensland’s Coal and Coal Seam Gas Resources – a New 
Approach to Overlapping Tenure in Queensland (May 2012). 
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development licence (MDL) and exploration permits for coal (EPC)) and mining leases (MLs) over 
CSG tenements as of right, assuming other application requirements are satisfied. The main rationale 
for this approach is that it removes uncertainty over grant of production tenures and timing, it 
alleviates administrative burdens and it removes the need for ministerial preference decisions. It also 
unlocks access to areas for production that otherwise would not be available under the existing 
legislative framework.
35
 
 The mechanics whereby this proposed scheme would operate hinges upon giving coal a “right of 
way” within a defined area of sole occupancy36 commensurate with efficient and safe mining 
operations for a limited period. In essence it is proposed that the coal party be given exclusive use of 
an initial mining area, being the minimum area representing 10 years of safe and efficient coal mining 
operations based on the mining lease holder’s mine plans and associated mine infrastructure.37 
Associated with this concept is a rolling abandonment model
38
 whereby as the mine advances, the 
CSG tenure holder will progressively abandon the area to the mining lease holder. Similarly as the 
area of active mining operations advances there will be (subject to requirements for rehabilitation and 
placement of essential infrastructure) a corresponding retreat of the area of sole occupancy to enable 
the CSG tenure holder to re-access areas as soon as practicable. The main reason for giving coal this 
right of way is to recognise the smaller, more limited footprint of coal mining operations. This right 
of way principle would operate by allowing the co-existence of mining and CSG tenure over the same 
area, but the petroleum tenure holder’s rights will be temporarily suspended within the limited 
predetermined areas to permit mining operations to proceed. The petroleum tenure holder would 
retain rights to freely explore for and produce gas prior to and outside the area of sole occupancy and 
will have first right of refusal to all incidental coal seam gas (ICSG) produced from the area of 
overlap of the mining lease. 
 In order to moderate adverse impacts that granting a mining lease holder a right of way could 
have on underlying CSG operations, especially where a mining lease is granted over a producing 
petroleum lease, a balance is struck in the Report between notice and compensation and an inverse 
relationship between the two is advocated; namely, that where appropriate notice is given to the CSG 
tenement holder of the coal party’s intention to establish mining operations in a particular area to 
allow adequate opportunity to extract CSG in that area in advance of the coal mining operations 
commencing then no compensation for “lost CSG” is contemplated. Conversely where the notice 
period is less than that embraced by the legislation then compensation for lost gas is payable. In 
addition compensation is payable by a coal party exercising its right of way where the exercise of that 
right of way affects existing gas infrastructure, with the coal party having an obligation to compensate 
the gas party for any impact upon major gas infrastructure (eg processing facilities, transmission 
infrastructure) but not for minor gas infrastructure (such as wells and gathering lines).
39
  
 These proposed arrangements to deal with problems of overlapping tenure received broad 
support from the coal and CSG industries and in response the Queensland Government have 
convened a Government Industry Steering Group to move these proposals forward and to provide 
oversight in relation to the work to be done by 12 specialist committees who will work on the detail 
of some issues raised in the overlapping tenure report.
40
 This Steering Group and the specialist 
committees are scheduled to commence their work in November 2012. 
 The reforms proposed by the coal and CSG industries are potentially very beneficial to both 
industries and to the State as they provide a clearer path to production. The report recognises that the 
 
35 Queensland Resources Council, n 34, ppIbid., pages 17-18. 
36 Queensland Resources Council, n 34, ppIbid., pages 24-34. 
37 Queensland Resources Council, n 34, pIbid., page 12 (definition of “initial mining area”) and pages pp 25-27. 
38 Queensland Resources Council, n 34, ppIbid., pages 28-31. 
39 Queensland Resources Council, n 34, pp 40-57. 
40 Technical working groups are proposed to consider matters such as health and safety, land access, calculation of 
compensation and dispute resolution processes. 
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preferred position is that parties negotiate an outcome to suit their particular overlapping 
circumstances, but provides an integrated package of solutions to current difficulties. 
<DIV>OTHER REFORMS 
The government have convened a Queensland Resources Cabinet Committee
41
 to identify and remove 
impediments to project assessments and approvals, to review existing polices and legislation to 
further cut red tape, to identify ways to fast-track investment in the resources sector, to maximise 
local business opportunities as a result of resource developments, to ensure a coordinated and 
integrated Queensland Government approval regime, to mobilise resources to accommodate timely 
Queensland Government approvals and to ensure approvals are provided through an environmentally 
sustainable framework. This broad ranging agenda has generated a significant range of responses 
from individual coal companies and it is beyond the scope of this article to canvass the entire 
spectrum of issues raised by the coal industry. However, in this section an attempt is made to identify 
areas where residual concerns or impediments to development are most keenly felt or expressed by 
the coal industry
42
 with examples to reinforce the thrust of those concerns. 
 A common concern is that too much focus in the environmental area is upon the process of 
environmental protection rather than upon the expected environmental outcomes. For example 
existing Environmental Authorities (EAs) are in many cases overly directive and describe how certain 
works have to be implemented, rather than focus on the expected environmental protection outcomes. 
For instance where EA’s still specifically require internally drained landforms as part of rehabilitation 
of landforms notwithstanding that in some cases this is proven to be seriously flawed (and recognised 
as such and will not assist in achieving acceptable contemporary post-mining standards). Another 
specific example is where EAs specify a blanket-type standard of post-mining rehabilitation outcome, 
which are neither practical nor in line with expectations of the mine operator, community and larger 
environmental thought groups. EAs should allow for sites to develop, in conjunction with key 
stakeholders, what the correct post-mining rehabilitation use should be. In this specific case, it would 
most likely be a combination of (i) native vegetation for provision of some ecosystem services, and 
(ii) agricultural grazing.  
 Another common concern relates to inflexibility in the regulatory structure. This may occur in the 
context of allowing minor amendments to EAs without having to go through a formal amendment 
process with the expense and delay this entails or arise, eg through overly conservative and restrictive 
water release conditions. In this latter case these conditions have led to a situation where several 
mines have had to manage a large inventory of legacy water on the mine sites, without the ability 
through the operations’ Environmental Authorities (EA’s)EAs to release water. In addition, mines 
then had to rely on Transitional Environmental Programs (TEP’s) pursuant to s 339 of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1994, in order to allow for flood release conditions after extraordinary 
flood events. The TEP process was firstly not designed to cater for emergency situations, and has led 
to a situation where operations are still dealing with the results, including but not limited to an 
inability to access reserves, resulting in lost production and revenue and increased operating costs. 
This it is argued by the coal industry is clearly a situation where emergency release conditions should 
be allowed in the Environmental Authority, and specifically to increase maximum allowable release 
rates of mine affected waters during various stream flow events and to increase release limits for 
sulphates and electrical conductivity in downstream receiving waters. 
 In the context of balancing interests between landowners and coal companies land access and 
compensation issues frequently occasion considerable delay. The coal industry often asserts that 
landowners are using the current regime to delay mining exploration and/or to obtain a windfall 
amount of compensation. Without debating the merits of this argument it is nevertheless clear that a 
 
41 This committee comprises the Deputy Premier and Minister for State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, Jeff Seeney, 
the Treasurer and Minister for Trade, Tim Nicholls, the Minister for Natural Resources and Mines, Andrew Cripps, the 
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, John McVeigh, the Minister for Environment and Heritage Protection, 
Andrew Powell, and the Minister for National Parks, Recreation, Sport and Racing, Steve Dickson. 
42 The author is not able to comment on all companies expressions of concern but has received feedback from several 
companies as to the thrust of their recommendations for further reform. 
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standard set of compensation amounts covering most of the specific types of exploration activities 
would go a long way to speeding up the process which is now subject to detailed negotiation with 
landowners. More attention should be focussed also on the scope and operation of restricted land 
provisions. Under the Mineral Resources Act 1989 a mining lease (ML) cannot be granted over the 
surface of “restricted land” unless the owner of the land has consented in writing and that consent has 
been lodged with the Mining Registrar before the end of the objection period. “Restricted Land’ 
covers a number of scenarios and includes eg, land within 50 m of an “artificial water storage 
connected to a water supply”. If the coal company cannot obtain an owner’s consent, the broad 
definition of restricted land effectively prevents the coal company from mining within 50 m laterally 
of old water tanks and 100 m laterally of other old structures such as sheds, thereby sterilising a 
significant economic resource. It is argued that the rationale behind “restricted land” for mining leases 
is deficient given the owner of the land is generally unable to use or benefit from the restricted land 
(eg water tanks) given the grant of the mining lease over the remainder of the property. While a case 
can therefore be properly made for restrictions applicable to exploring on restricted land to remain it 
may be that restricted land should be removed from the mining lease provisions of the Act. All 
restricted land can be compensated for like all other mining lease land and having the “Swiss cheese” 
effect within a mining lease due to restricted land can remove substantial quantities of mineable 
reserves thus depriving the State of significant sums in royalties, particularly when there is no specific 
ability for a landowner to continue to use a house, dam or stockyard if mining was occurring in the 
near vicinity. Restricted land as it is currently defined and interpreted effectively provides a veto to 
mining operations and/or significant impacts upon the viability of mining of lease areas. Accordingly 
coal companies have asked government to reduce the scope and application of restricted land relating 
to mining leases (as opposed to exploration permits) under the Mineral Resources Act 1989.  
 Finally, in this brief summation of other areas of concern, mention should be made of problems 
and issues associated with infrastructure required to support mining operations. The coal industry has 
long agitated that investment to expand multi-user export infrastructure is critical. However, the 
common charge of many coal companies, as echoed by the Queensland Resources Council,
43
 is that 
the current model is defective; namely that commercial negotiations between individual resource 
companies and regulated service providers to expand export capacity have highlighted the reality of 
dealing with infrastructure service providers that are not aligned with the interests of developing the 
State’s natural resources – in that they seek to extract monopoly rents from resource companies rather 
than maximise the efficiency of the supply chain. In relation to delivery of rail and port capacity the 
coal industry has urged reform of the Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997 to specifically 
provide for statutory processes to facilitate the timely investment in multi-user infrastructure, 
including specific obligations to facilitate direct investment from customers to ensure that a 
monopolist’s incentive to restrict supply, including restricting or delaying investment necessary to 
expand multi-user facilities, can be addressed within the established regulatory regime. Of particular 
concern to coal companies at this time is the financial and commercial viability of the Queensland 
Rail Network’s Standard User Funding Model and planning necessary to deliver port capacity 
(terminal, channel and rail) in and around Gladstone. 
<DIV>CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that much has been done and that much more needs to be 
done to improve the regulatory environment in which coal companies operate in Queensland. This is 
clear even without taking into account the impact of various revenue statutes and imposts such as the 
minerals resources rent tax,
44
 the carbon tax
45
 and coal royalties. 
 Cutting or reducing red and green tape, establishing efficient and less complex approvals 
pathways for development and infrastructure and affording greater administrative flexibility will all 
 
43 See Queensland Resources Council, Proposed Amendments to the Queensland Competition Authority Act and Transport 
Infrastructure Act (July 2010). 
44 See Minerals Resource Rent Tax Act 2011 (Cth). 
45 See Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth). 
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encourage investment in coal production in Queensland. Perhaps even more significant is the creation 
going forward of a stable regulatory environment whereby coal companies can have confidence that 
investment decisions are made against parameters that are likely to prevail over the intended project’s 
lifetime. 
 In this regard it is critical for regulators to acknowledge, obvious as it may seem, that the market 
for coal is an international market, that its main producers are global companies and that the resources 
sector is genuinely international in scope and operations. As a consequence many, if not most, 
significant development decisions are made with reference to profitability, cost, sovereign risk and 
other factors as measured against competing projects in Australia and in other countries. Frequent 
change to the ground rules does not engender confidence nor encourage investment. All coal 
companies operating in Queensland and elsewhere need certainty and stability. 
 
